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Defining One’s Own Concept of
Existence and the Meaning of the Universe:
The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are
greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the
1
rest. . . .
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person
2
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.

I. INTRODUCTION
3

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the
landmark 2003 ruling overturning a Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy, strikes at the very heart of a debate that has
been raging in academic and political circles ever since the Court’s
4
revival of substantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut. The
crux of the debate focuses on a question primal to political theory: if
an expansive understanding is to be given to the right of the
individual “to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
5
the universe, and of the mystery of human life,” what legitimate role
is left for the state to declare moral limitations upon the definitions
individuals choose?
1. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 267, 268 (Joel Feinberg &
Jules Coleman eds., 7th ed. 2004).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
3. Id.
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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This note argues that Lawrence stands for a presumption of
liberty protecting the private acts of individuals under the Due
Process Clause. Simply put, this means that if the government fails to
show that its restrictions on individual exercises of liberty are not
necessary and proper regulations of behavior harmful to others, the
mere claim that the government is upholding morality grounded in
“history” or “traditions” should not justify such restrictions on
liberty. This reading of Lawrence recognizes the Court’s decision
both as a victory for a more sound adjudication of substantive due
process claims and as an accurate understanding of the libertarian
underpinnings of American constitutionalism. Far from the fears of
the dissent, Lawrence does not signal the end of morality in the law,
but rather it recasts morality in terms that are palatable both to
contemporary intuitions of what liberty means and to a classical
understanding of the role of the individual in liberal democracy. In
the final analysis, Lawrence is best seen as a substantial victory for the
right of all Americans to define their own concepts of meaning and
value in matters fundamental to how individuals constitute their very
existence.
Part II of this note gives an overview of the Court’s substantive
due process jurisprudence in order to give context to Lawrence’s
potential reach beyond sexual autonomy cases. Part III analyzes the
Court’s opinion in Lawrence, focusing on Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting
opinion. Part IV offers a particular interpretation of the majority
opinion, arguing that Lawrence is nothing less than a watershed
moment both for a renewed soundness in constitutional
jurisprudence, and for the revival of libertarian values that have far
too long been ignored by the Court. This part argues that Lawrence
can and should be read as ushering in a presumption of liberty in
subsequent cases brought before the Court. This part also offers a
rejoinder to the principal arguments of Justice Scalia’s dissent,
relying on the writings of Joel Feinberg to argue that Scalia’s most
sweeping claims are misplaced or incorrect because they fail to grasp
the proper limits of legal moralism. Part V offers a short conclusion.
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The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY:
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM SLAUGHTERHOUSE TO “FOOTNOTE FOUR PLUS”

As an overview of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence, this section analyzes the Court’s watershed moments
in substantive rights analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment to
set the context for the Court’s decision in Lawrence, and to show
why Lawrence has the potential to correct some of the Court’s more
egregious errors in this field. The robust conception of liberty
advanced by Lawrence embraces a view of autonomy that is central
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of substantive liberty as
well as to broader conceptions of human autonomy central to the
purposes of liberal society. As the following analysis will show, a
crucial error in much of the Court’s earlier substantive rights
jurisprudence was its failure to grasp the primacy of a presumption in
favor of such conceptions of liberty and autonomy over the
competing presumption in favor of the government’s regulatory
authority.
As has been noted by numerous commentators, Lawrence, even
apart from its socially significant holding, is a potential watershed
because of the way in which the Court reviewed the statute before it.
“Lawrence is one of several recent cases indicating that the certainty
of the dichotomy between strict scrutiny and low-level scrutiny is
6
breaking down.” Justice Kennedy’s opinion striking down the Texas
statute specifically did not declare a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. For Supreme Court scholars, this point is
significant because, “[u]ntil recently, careful review, indeed any
meaningful review, of the substantive legitimacy of criminal statutes
6. Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality
Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 233 (2005).
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action
program at the University of Michigan Law School under a balancing test while applying strict
scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding state law disadvantaging
homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis test); Casey, 505 U.S.
at 869 (upholding a woman’s constitutional liberty to terminate her pregnancy, but holding
that such a liberty is not absolute and should be balanced against the competing interests of
the state); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990) (recognizing a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in individual refusal of medical treatment, but
holding that states may require such a refusal to be established by clear and convincing
evidence); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985) (using
rational basis to strike down a zoning ordinance disadvantaging the mentally disabled under
the Equal Protection Clause).
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was essentially nonexistent unless a narrow category of ‘fundamental
7
rights’ were implicated.” Lawrence, in the clearest of terms,
indicates that this may no longer be the case; in other words, “[t]he
mere enactment of a criminal statute will be insufficient to establish
that it is not an arbitrary act, and is therefore a violation of
8
[substantive] due process.” In coming years, the Court may well see
Lawrence as ushering in the expanded use of “rational basis with a
bite” review that places the burden on the government to establish
the necessity of its regulation, rather than on the individual to
establish the fundamentality of her liberty interest. Seen in this way,
Lawrence has the potential to reorient the Court’s jurisprudence in a
number of areas related to substantive due process claims beyond the
limited area of human sexual autonomy.
A. The Original Meaning (and Early “Slaughter”)
of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution “to ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill
of 1866 and to prevent future Congresses from reneging on its
9
guarantees.” One of the most significant functions of the
Fourteenth Amendment was its protection of certain fundamental
rights stemming from federal citizenship against encroachment by all
10
branches of state governments. The Amendment provides, in part,
that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
7. Beschle, supra note 6, at 233.
8. Id.
9. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 60 (2003).
10. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What’s so Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J. LAW
& LIBERTY 7 (forthcoming).
At the risk of oversimplification, another way to characterize the distinct functions of
each of the three clauses is this: The Privileges or Immunities Clause is aimed mainly
at the legislative branch of state governments and enjoins them from making certain
laws (but it also enjoins the enforcement of improper laws too). The Due Process
Clause is aimed mainly at the judicial branch of state governments and enjoins them
from sanctioning the violation of otherwise proper laws without following procedures
that ensure accurate outcomes (but it would apply to “administrative” procedures as
well). And the Equal Protection Clause is aimed mainly at the executive branch of
state governments and mandates that protection of proper laws be provided equally
to all persons.
Id.
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privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
11
the equal protection of the laws.

Explaining the history and purpose of each of the three preceding
clauses is well beyond the modest purview of this paper; nevertheless,
it is helpful to illustrate a few principles that underlie the Privileges
or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite the robust debate in contemporary constitutional theory
over the existence and validity of unenumerated constitutional rights,
ample evidence exists that the framers of the original Bill of Rights
and of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for constitutional
protection of individual natural rights not specifically listed in the
12
text of the Constitution.
The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended for the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
serve as a bulwark against infringement of enumerated and
unenumerated rights by state legislatures. In 1833, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
13
applied only to the federal government, and not to the states. This
precedent, among others, called into question the validity of early
14
Reconstruction era legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Representative John Bingham, author of the Fourteenth
Amendment, argued that the absence of Congressional power to
protect the rights of American citizens from state governments
15
“makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment.”
Moreover, he saw slavery as the issue preventing the original framers
from protecting the natural rights of all citizens against unwarranted
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See generally BARNETT, supra note 9, at 259, arguing that theories of both original
intent and original meaning reveal a desire on the part of the respective framers of the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments to protect unenumerated natural rights.
The Ninth Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause referred to natural
rights because it was impossible to specify them all in advance. Any approach that
overlooks this in favor of particular historically situated liberties runs afoul of
original meaning. . . . [These provisions were] added to the Constitution precisely
because it was impossible to enumerate all the liberties we have and undesirable even
to try.
Id. at 258–59.
13. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
14. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 193.
15. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866)).
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state interference; had such a provision been placed in the original
Constitution, its existence would have negated the institution of
16
slavery—a bargain that would have likely doomed ratification.
In drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
“Bingham used the words privileges and immunities as a shorthand
description of fundamental or constitutional rights” that state
17
The phrase “privileges and
legislatures could not abridge.
immunities” of course can be found in the original 1789
18
Constitution, and had a long and distinguished history by the time
the Fourteenth
Amendment
was
drafted.
“Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England . . . divided the rights and
liberties of Englishmen into those ‘immunities’ that were the
residuum of natural liberties and those ‘privileges’ that society had
19
provided in lieu of natural rights.” This view was fleshed out in
early American jurisprudence by Justice Bushrod Washington’s
20
celebrated opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, a decision he authored
while sitting as a circuit court trial judge. Justice Washington
famously wrote in that case:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious
than difficult to enumerate . . . . These, and many others which
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and
immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each
state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to use the
expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the
old articles of confederation) “the better to secure and perpetuate

16. Id. at 193–94.
17. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
19. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 64 (1986)).
20. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
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mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the
21
different states of the Union.”

Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion represents an articulation
by the first generation of American jurists that recognizes the validity
of unenumerated natural rights protected as privileges and
immunities by the Constitution. When explaining the meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Senator Jacob Howard read
from Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion, stating that “[s]uch is
the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the
22
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.” Speaking
of the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, he further noted: “To these privileges and
immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be
fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these
should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the
23
first eight amendments of the Constitution.”
A simple reading of the plain language of the Fourteenth
Amendment as understood by those at the time of its adoption may
well have recognized that it serves as a limiting function preventing
state legislatures from enacting measures that unnecessarily abridged
the natural rights, both enumerated and unenumerated, shared by all
American citizens; unfortunately, the Supreme Court eviscerated the

21. Id. at 551–52. Justice Washington does list several examples of recognized privileges
and immunities here:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe
for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus;
to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold
and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as
some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly
embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws
or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
Id.
22. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 194 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (citation omitted).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause in its infamous 1873 decision in the
24
Slaughter-House Cases, rendering it a dead letter.
Slaughter-House is a problematic decision for several reasons.
Chief among these is that it completely distorted the meaning of the
25
Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the Court’s decision in
Slaughter-House, the Fourteenth Amendment was effectively stripped
of one of its primary purposes: to restrict state legislatures from
enacting measures that violated the substantive rights—enumerated
and not—presumed to be enjoyed by all citizens of the nation
because of their status as such. The effect of Slaughter-House was to
limit judicial recourse of citizens denied substantive liberties as a
result of state legislation. With this in mind, it is not an
overstatement to argue that the case effectively nullified one of the
major purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judicial protection
of substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was not
completely destroyed by Slaughter-House however. Within a few
decades, the Court would begin the slow process of applying the
Due Process Clause to do the work intended for the Privileges or

24. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The Court upheld a state law granting a monopoly to a certain
slaughterhouse in the city of New Orleans. In rejecting an argument based on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, against clear evidence to the
contrary, held that the clause did not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, but
rather protected only rights that flow from the relationship between a United States citizen and
the federal government. Justices Field and Bradley each authored vigorous dissents defending
judicial application of the clause against state legislation and arguing in favor of the validity of
unenumerated natural rights against encroachment from state legislation. Justice Field’s dissent
argued that the clause does not attempt to confer new privileges or immunities upon U.S.
citizens; it rather assumes that there are such privileges and immunities that belong of right to
citizens as such and ordains that they shall not be abridged by state legislation. Justice
Bradley’s dissent suggests monopolies are banned under a theory of natural rights observed in
the Declaration of Independence and assumed in the Constitutional structure.
25. See supra note 10; see also Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice
Miller, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
627, 686 (1994).
[T]here was a clear consensus that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to have a substantive role. That role was to enforce
national privileges and immunities or rights. . . . These views were before the public
in the debates of Congress and undoubtedly specifically known to the Justices.
When one examines the opinion articulated by Justice Miller to defend the
majority decision, one finds the errors so immense and the gap between the intent
of the amendment and Miller’s ruling so great, that many are willing, on that basis
alone, to believe the [sic] Miller deliberately attempted to defeat the force of the
amendment.
Aynes, supra.
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Immunities Clause: to limit arbitrary suppressions of liberty by state
26
legislatures.
B. The Rise and Fall of Early Substantive Due Process
As the Progressive Era dawned at the end of the 19th century,
state legislatures began passing laws limiting a variety of economic
activities as well as passing a substantial amount of morals legislation
27
aimed at promoting “public health.” Even as this type of legislation
grew in popularity, the Supreme Court began infrequently striking
28
down a number of state statutes on due process grounds. Most
29
famously, in Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down
maximum-hour regulations for workers in a bakeshop on the
grounds that such provisions violated the so-called “liberty of
contract” implicit in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process protection
of liberty. The Court also struck down non-economic legislation on
Due Process grounds, holding for instance that liberty embraced by
the Due Process Clause grants the right to provide one’s children
30
with religious education, and the right to educate one’s children in
26. This move is controversial of course, both for opponents and even many proponents
of unenumerated constitutional rights. There is a valid argument that can be made to
demonstrate that there is a “substantive” component of liberty understood by the Due Process
Clause—namely that it is within the province of “judicial review to ensure that a law being
applied to a particular person was within the proper constitutional power of the legislature to
enact,” making the scrutiny of “the substance of statutes . . . a part of the procedures that must
be followed before a law may be enforced by death, imprisonment, or fine.” Barnett, supra
note 10, at 7 (forthcoming). Nevertheless, the move to the Due Process Clause to review state
legislation distorts the Fourteenth Amendment in many key ways:
(1) It shifts the substantive scrutiny of laws from the Privileges or Immunities Clause
to the Due Process Clause; (2) because the Due Process Clause protects all persons,
using it to scrutinize laws obscures the fact that a proper law may make distinctions
between citizens and non-citizens; (3) it distorts the original meaning of “liberty” in
the Due Process Clause by stretching its meaning beyond the matter of deprivation
of liberty by imprisonment; (4) when “liberty” is expanded in this way, it is not clear
how it fits with “property”; and (5) it limits the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment to life, liberty, and property and not other positive rights or privileges
of citizenship that may properly be denied to non-citizens but not to citizens. The
most serious consequence of stretching the Due Process Clause beyond its original
meaning to substantively scrutinize laws is how it undermines the legitimacy of this
type of scrutiny.
Id.
27. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 22.
28. Id.
29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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31

one’s native language. These cases are significant in that they do
not find deprivations of life, liberty, or property because of
unconstitutional or unfair defects in the procedural aspects of state
action. Rather, the Court rejected the laws because they infringed on
the substantive liberty rights that all Americans were guaranteed by
virtue of their status as citizens. In short, so-called “substantive due
process” was used by the Court to protect the type of rights that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment originally envisioned to be
embraced by the Privileges or Immunities Clauses.
32
Today, Lochner and its progeny stand among the most
criticized and universally rejected decisions in the history of the
Supreme Court. Progressives both then and now saw Lochner as
undue judicial interference with the rational legislative judgment that
contract rights and wealth distribution are not beyond the reach of
33
Similarly, many modern
appropriate state intervention.
conservatives, likely upset with the Court’s revival of a form of
substantive due process in post-Griswold sexual autonomy cases, also
reject the reasoning of Lochner and view the case as an egregious
34
form of judicial activism.
The Lochner era was indeed flawed, but not in the way that its
critics from both the left and the right most commonly complain.
The problem with Lochner is not that it protected economic rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment or that it required state
governments to justify economic regulations without granting such
legislative judgments a presumption of rationality, and thus,
31. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating a law
treating the manufacture of ice like a public utility on Due Process grounds); Williams v.
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (rejecting price regulations on Due Process grounds);
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding minimum wage law for women
workers violated the Due Process Clause); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding
that laws protecting the right to organize unions violated the Due Process Clause).
33. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
34. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 49 (1990):
In his 1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from what he
conceived to be “a mere meddlesome interference,” asked rhetorically, “[A]re we all
. . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?” The correct answer, where the
Constitution is silent, must be “yes.” Being “at the mercy of legislative majorities” is
merely another way of describing the basic American plan: representative
democracy. We may all deplore its results from time to time, but that does not
empower judges to set them aside; the Constitution allows only voters to do that.
Id. (citations omitted).
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constitutionality. The Fourteenth Amendment, as originally drafted
and understood, did not contemplate the protection of individual
privileges and immunities only from legislation that is discriminatory;
rather the amendment contemplated a robust view of individual
liberties, both enumerated and unenumerated in the text of the
constitution that were intended to be amiable to judicial
enforcement. As Professor Barnett points out, “The content of the
Civil Rights Act is significant because it identifies some of the
privileges or immunities protected from abridgement by the
Fourteenth Amendment. And these included the ‘right . . . to make
and enforce contracts’—the very right protected by the Court in
35
Lochner v. New York.”
The real problem with Lochner is that the Court tacitly accepted
the premises of Slaughter-House when it used the Due Process
Clause as the mechanism to enforce economic liberties. Because the
Court used the Due Process Clause—and even then used it
36
inconsistently and almost haphazardly —to invalidate economic
legislation during the Lochner era, it opened itself up to charges of
activism because it stretched the clause beyond its original
37
applications regarding the purely procedural aspects of due process.
Thus, although the Lochner court was rightly attempting to discern
the proper limits of economic liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, its project was doomed from the start because it was
unable to use the broader contours of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to establish such limits. Left only to use the Due Process
Clause, the Lochner Court developed a theory of economic liberty
that was ill-suited for interpretation under the Due Process Clause as
it should properly be understood: as a protection against unfair or
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or property in the judicial
38
administration of the law.

35. Barnett, supra note 10, at 8–9.
36. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining a state law limiting
employment hours for female employees notwithstanding a Due Process Clause claim).
37. See Barnett, supra note 10.
Lochner and the other Due Process Clause cases of the Progressive Era—and
substantive due process cases today—are all problematic because they continue to
respect the precedent of the Slaughter-House Cases and refuse to restore the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Id. at 9.
38. Id.
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As the Great Depression dawned and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt instituted New Deal economic policies that expanded
elements of the progressive agenda to the national level, the Supreme
Court became increasingly resilient to efforts to regulate the national
economy through Congressional power under the Commerce
39
Clause. Roosevelt responded to the Court’s rejection of New Deal
legislation with his infamous “court-packing plan.” The plan
ultimately failed, but whether from the pressure placed on the Court
from Roosevelt and public opinion, or from the influx of more
progressive appointees on the Court, the Supreme Court abandoned
40
its controversial Lochner-era jurisprudence in 1937. The Court, in
one of its most monumental reversals, began upholding economic
regulations against individual claims of right and refusing to read
substantive due process claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment
41
against the presumed constitutionality of regulatory legislation.
What remained of the “substantive” due process of the Lochner
era was effectively swept away the next year by the Court’s decision
42
in United States v. Carolene Products Co. The decision itself, which
upheld a federal law that prohibited the shipment of “filled milk” (an
oil added milk product) in interstate commerce, swept far beyond
the regulatory apparatus implicated by the facts of the case. The
Carolene Products Court ushered in a “presumption of constitutionality” to the rational regulatory acts of legislative bodies, declaring
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
43
legislators.”

39. See, e.g., Schecter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
40. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state maximum
hours law for female employees and effectively overturning Lochner).
41. See id.; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
42. 304 U.S. at 144.
43. Id. at 152.
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The case is most noted for its fourth footnote, which appended
to the presumption of constitutionality for the rationally-based
regulatory acts of government a reservation of judicial scrutiny for
the non-economic rights protected by the Bill of Rights, and for the
protection of “discrete and insular minorities” who are not protected
within the political process. It is hard to overstate the impact of
45
Footnote Four in the Court’s substantive due process analysis. The
footnote established the basis for modern strict scrutiny review
conducted by the Supreme Court. Legislative acts are given a
presumption of constitutionality by reviewing courts based on a
theory that such laws are the result of a rational and democratic
process. Only where a law targets a discrete or insular minority that
does not have access to the political process, or where the law
violates the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights are the courts
allowed to use more exacting “strict scrutiny” to evaluate the
justification of legislative acts.
As the tide of Roosevelt appointees took their seats on the
Court, it appeared substantive due process was dead. The regime
44. Id. at 152 n.4 (Holding that “[t]here may be a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . [P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
45. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087,
1088–89 (1982). Justice Powell described the legacy of Footnote Four on subsequent
constitutional law as such:
This footnote now is recognized as a primary source of “strict scrutiny” judicial
review. Indeed, many scholars think it actually commenced a new era in
constitutional law. The footnote also is thought to have provided its own theoretical
justification. The theory properly extracted from Footnote 4, as expressed by more
than a few prominent scholars, is roughly as follows: The fundamental character of
our government is democratic. Our constitution assumes that majorities should rule
and that the government should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part,
Congress and the state legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose. But
there are certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process.
And the political process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the
way it protects most of us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the
Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of government: First, to clear
away impediments to participation, and ensure that all groups can engage equally in
the political process; and Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation
inimical to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in
the legislative process.
Id.
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enacted by Footnote Four served as a standard by which the Court
continually deferred to the rationality of the legislature in reviewing
46
due process claims. In 1955, Justice William O. Douglas declared
the complete death of economic substantive due process, noting,
“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
47
thought.”
C. Substantive Due Process After Griswold: Footnote Four Plus
As it would turn out, reports of the death of substantive due
process were greatly exaggerated.48 Within a decade of Justice
Douglas’s eulogy for substantive review of due process claims, the
Court revived the doctrine to examine cases concerning personal
autonomy and sexual privacy. The roots of this jurisprudence can be
49
found in Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.
Foreshadowing something of the approach that the Court would
50
adopt five years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Harlan
argued for a judicial role in defining and establishing the limits of
personal autonomy embedded within the “substantive” component
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Recognizing that personal autonomy—implicated in
the case before him in the form of a married couple’s sexual
relations—is a form of “liberty” protected by the Constitution,
Justice Harlan set out to establish the limits of permissible activity
protected by that liberty. Thus, for Justice Harlan, the Constitution’s
protection of liberty is broad and calls for a judicial role in defining
such liberty:
46. See e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963). After noting that the
Court had declined “the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws
which the majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise,” Justice Black
commented, “We refuse to sit as a ‘super legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.’ . . .
[Whether] the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes or
some other is no concern of ours.” Id. (citations omitted).
47. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
48 . Following the erroneous publication of a premature obituary in the New York
Journal, Mark Twain famously responded: “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”
See Wikipedia, Mark Twain, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain (last visited Aug. 3,
2006).
49. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This
“liberty” is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
51
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .

Justice Harlan’s “rational continuum” of liberty embraced the
notion that in a constitutional system, the conscientious judge has a
duty to reject impositions on liberty that are arbitrary or purposeless.
Although this view is not a sweeping libertarian rejection of plenary
legislative powers, it is the contemporary articulation of the principle
that judges have a defined constitutional role in establishing the
content and limits of the broad guarantees of liberty established in
52
the Constitution.
Thus, in the context of personal sexual
autonomy—and its expression in the right of the marital couple to
have access to contraceptives—Justice Harlan would hold that it is a
liberty interest entitled to heightened scrutiny by the courts. As
Justice Harlan wrote,
This, then, is the precise character of the enactment whose
Constitutional measure we must take. The statute must pass a more
rigorous Constitutional test than that going merely to the
plausibility of its underlying rationale. This enactment involves
what, by common understanding throughout the English-speaking
world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of
“liberty” . . . and it is this which requires that the statute be
53
subjected to “strict scrutiny.”
54

In 1965 the Court decided the case of Griswold v. Connecticut
and ushered in the contemporary era of substantive due process that
55
has been described as “Footnote Four Plus.” In this watershed
case, the Court revived a strain of its substantive due process
jurisprudence, which had been dormant since the end of the Lochner
51. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542–43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(analyzing favorably Justice Harlan’s dissent regarding the limited judicial review role).
53. Poe, 367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 254.
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era in 1937, by striking down a Connecticut law interfering with the
right of married couples to gain information about, and to use,
contraceptives. Justice Douglas’s opinion for the majority found that
a right to privacy, protecting the right of married couples to make
contraceptive choices, can be construed from “penumbras and
emanations” of the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
56
Amendments to the Constitution. Justice Harlan concurred,
advocating a substantive due process theory of liberty similar to the
57
one sketched in his Poe opinion, and Justice Goldberg concurred
arguing that the law violated unenumerated rights protected by the
58
Ninth Amendment.
Thus, with Griswold, the Court reentered the substantive due
process thicket by moving beyond the technical limits of Footnote
Four and embracing judicial interpretation and enforcement of
unenumerated rights. However, just like the Lochner decision before
it, Griswold would prove controversial for its advocacy of
unenumerated rights and for its seemingly Byzantine approach in
deciding which unenumerated rights are entitled to judicial scrutiny
and protection. The general approach that would emerge in
substantive due process cases following Griswold involved a focus on
the “fundamentality” of the liberty interest being asserted against a
particular law or regulation. A right attains fundamental status if it is
“deeply rooted in [the] history and traditions” of Anglo-American
59
jurisprudence or if it is “implicit in the concept of ordered
60
liberty.” Substantive due process in the Footnote Four-Plus regime
enacted by Griswold thus serves to “elevate[] some unenumerated
rights to the exalted status of ‘fundamental’ while disparaging the
61
other liberties of the people as mere ‘liberty interests.’” In short, if
a plaintiff challenging a regulation cannot demonstrate that the right
being asserted is fundamental, their substantive due process claim
will likely fall to the presumption of constitutionality given to
legislation under “rational basis review.” In this sense, the majority
opinion’s approach in Griswold is markedly different from the view
articulated by Justice Harlan, both in his Poe dissent and in his
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Griswold, 381 U.S at 484.
Id. at 501–02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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Griswold concurrence. Under Justice Harlan’s view, the substantive
rights protected by liberty need not be fleshed out according to the
specific enumerations of the Bill of Rights. Rather there is a clear
judicial role—albeit one informed by clear standards of review—that
prescribes protecting liberty interests that are not explicitly listed in
the Constitution, but nevertheless are inherent to the very idea of
63
ordered liberty. An important question remains unanswered that
will emerge again later: if the Court were to view liberty as a
“rational continuum” in the manner suggested by Justice Harlan, to
what extent does the influence of traditional and historical values
govern the limits of judicially recognized and protected liberty
64
interests?
In the years following Griswold, the Court has issued a number
65
of holdings that together have come to recognize “that the
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the
person,” particularly in regards to issues of sexual and reproductive
62. See Griswold, 381 U.S at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring) (“In my view, the proper
constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.’ For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman, I believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or
more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their
radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on
its own bottom.” (citations omitted)).
63. Id. at 501.
64. But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan, in a departure from his disciples on the Lawrence court, makes a strong case for
traditional moral values as a strong limitation against judicial expansion of protected liberty
interests in certain types of sexual conduct:
Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal.
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up,
as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which
express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form
a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.
Id.
65. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a
New York law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under sixteen
years of age); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to elect an
abortion has real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process
Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending contraceptive rights to nonmarried persons).
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66

freedom.
However, none of these cases started with the
presumption that an individual’s liberty interests are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary government regulations.
Rather, the Court’s focus remained on the fundamentality of the
privacy interest being asserted and the burden remained with the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that their substantive rights claim overcame
the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the government.
Moreover, although the Due Process Clause was used by the Court
as the doctrinal basis of several of its decisions during the last four
decades of the 20th century, its analysis remained with Griswold’s
emphasis on privacy, however nebulously constructed, rather than
with the protection of “liberty” associated with the writings of
Justice Harlan and more closely related to the type of unenumerated
rights envisioned in the pre-Slaughter-House Fourteenth Amendment.
D. Bowers v. Hardwick
One post-Griswold case, in particular, is highly relevant to any
discussion of Lawrence. In its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
67
the Court upheld a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy between
68
consenting adults against the challenge of a homosexual man who
was arrested for engaging in an act of homosexual intimacy in a fact
pattern nearly identical to the one that would come before the court
seventeen years later in Lawrence. Respondent Hardwick challenged
the Georgia statute on various Fourteenth Amendment grounds. A
deeply divided Burger Court ruled 5-4 that Georgia’s sodomy law
was constitutional, refusing, in the words of Justice Byron White’s
majority opinion, to declare “a fundamental right to engage in
69
homosexual sodomy.” In repudiating much of the Court’s sexual
autonomy jurisprudence since Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice White
66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
67. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (providing, in
pertinent part: “(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . .
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than 20 years . . . .”).
68. Significantly, at least in terms of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence
which focuses on the Equal Protection Clause in striking down the Texas law, the Georgia law
applied to heterosexual as well as homosexual acts of sodomy. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(1984).
69. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
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declared that “[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
70
Constitution.” Declining to offer strict scrutiny to Hardwick’s
71
Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Bowers majority similarly
72
rejected Hardwick’s argument that the law lacked a rational basis
because it served merely to express a majoritarian moral preference
against the legitimate privacy rights of individuals wishing to express
their sexual intimacy through acts made criminal under Georgia’s
law.
Four justices, led by Justice Harry Blackmun, dissented in the
73
boldest of terms. Blackmun, foreshadowing Lawrence, argued that
the majority’s claim that Hardwick was requesting a declaration of a
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy” was entirely
incorrect in light of the Court’s earlier sexual autonomy
74
jurisprudence.
The dissent strongly suggested the majority
unjustifiably focused on the act of homosexual sodomy and the social
taboos surrounding it, rather than the broader, and obviously
protected, “right to be left alone” in making personal decisions
70. Id. at 194–95.
71. Id. at 194 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best,
facetious.”).
72. Id. at 196. Justice White’s opinion defended the rationality of Georgia’s moral
justifications for its law in the staunchest of terms:
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, respondent asserts that
there must be a rational basis for the law and that there is none in this case other
than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to
support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if
all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such
claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the
sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis.
Id.
73. Id. at 214. Blackmun noted,
I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and
conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to
conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation’s history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do.
Id.
74. Id. at 199.
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about whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual
75
sexual intimacy. Such forms of conduct, the dissent observed, strike
to the very core of defining “human existence,” and are treated far
76
too lightly and dismissively by the majority.
E. Substantive Due Process in the Rehnquist Court:
Casey and Glucksberg
Substantive due process jurisprudence has been significantly
developed by key decisions during the 1990s. These decisions set the
tone for Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence and helped establish
the ongoing debate among members of the Court as to the proper
standards of review to be used in substantive due process cases.
In an important precursor to Lawrence, the Court shifted its
substantive due process emphasis from “privacy” to “liberty” in
1992. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in reaffirming the right to abortion
77
established in Roe v. Wade. The Court’s majority held that the
decision to abort a pregnancy, protected by the Due Process Clause,
deserved heightened scrutiny because of its essential relationship to a
person’s sense of ultimate identity and values, indeed the person’s
very conscience, explaining that
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could

75. Id.
76. Id. at 205 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
Blackmun argues,
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is “a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality.” The fact that individuals
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many “right”
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
78
compulsion of the State.

This language signaled a burgeoning paradigm shift in the
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. In Casey, liberty, not
privacy, did the work under the Due Process Clause. Justice Kennedy
would return this same reasoning eleven years later in Lawrence.
The Rehnquist Court issued another landmark substantive due
79
process decision in the 1997 case Washington v. Glucksberg. In
Glucksberg, the Court unanimously upheld a Washington law that
80
criminalized physician-assisted suicide. The plaintiffs, who included
both doctors and terminally ill patients, asserted a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause in allowing a mentally
81
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.
82
Relying heavily on history and the Anglo-American common law,
the Court concluded that there exists no fundamental liberty interest
in physician-assisted suicide. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, argued that in addition to the Court’s traditional criteria
for evaluating a substantive due process claim—“found in the history
and traditions” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—the
asserted fundamental liberty interest must be capable of “careful
83
description.” The Court thus refused to characterize a broader
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide such as “the right to die”
and thus concluded that no such fundamental liberty interest exists.
After denying strict scrutiny of the liberty interest asserted, the Court
found Washington’s asserted interests of preserving human life and
avoiding a slide towards euthanasia as easily meeting a rational basis
84
test.
Although the Chief Justice wrote for a unanimous Court, the
method of analysis used in the majority opinion to evaluate the
substantive due process claim was anything but unanimous. Five of
the Justices concurred with the Court’s decision, but differed from
the Court’s analysis on various points, many going as far as to argue
that patients have a right to palliative care, even if such care would
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 851.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 709.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 710–12.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 728.
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85

kill a patient. Indeed, at no point is it clear that a majority of the
Court accepted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s version of substantive due
process analysis.
Justice Souter’s concurrence focused on the importance of
Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent and argued that each deprivation of
liberty should be balanced against the relative strength of the state’s
interest involved. Justice Souter begins his concurrence by noting
the legacy of Slaughter-House on the Court’s substantive rights
86
jurisprudence. He then praises Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent as a
model for the proper judicial role in adjudicating substantive rights
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Souter argues that
the Poe dissent stands for no less than three key propositions: that
there is an important and recognized judicial role in conducting
substantive due process, “that the business of such review is not the
identification of extra-textual absolutes but scrutiny of a legislative
resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing principles, each quite
possibly worthy in and of itself, but each to be weighed within the
history of our values as a people,” and a recognition of “the basic
need to account for the two sides in the controversy and to respect
87
legislation within the zone of reasonableness.” With this in mind, it
is the duty of Courts reviewing substantive rights claims to recognize
“a continuum of rights to be free from ‘arbitrary impositions and
88
purposeless restraints.’” For Justice Souter, although history and
traditions are the starting place for this type of analysis, emerging
standards of liberty in a developing system of ordered liberty surely
must come into play for the judge conscientiously conducting
substantive due process review. Also, it is interesting to note that in
the above framework, the reviewing judge is concerned with the
rationality of the legislation rather than the fundamentality of certain

85. See id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s opinion on this
point was largely echoed by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
86. Id. at 760 n.6 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter notes:
The Slaughter-House Cases are important, of course, for their holding that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was no source of any but a specific handful of
substantive rights. . . . To a degree, then, that decision may have led the Court to
look to the Due Process Clause as a source of substantive rights. . . . But the courts’
use of due process clauses for that purpose antedated the 1873 decision, as we have
seen, and would in time be supported in the Poe dissent, as we shall see.
Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 762–65 (Souter, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring).
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extra-textual rights. The presumption in such analysis begins to shift
from regulatory constitutionality to individual liberty.
Taken with his joint opinion in Casey, Justice Souter’s
articulation of Justice Harlan’s Poe opinion reflected an emerging
awareness among some members of the Rehnquist Court that
substantive rights analysis is neither tied down to strict articulations
of the fundamentality of the right being asserted, nor exclusively to
history and tradition. Rather, for the first time, a substantial portion
of the Court’s membership recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a rational continuum of liberty rather than
“isolated pinpricks” of fundamental rights. The Casey plurality and
Justice Souter’s Glucksberg concurrence demonstrate that, by the
1990s, at least some members of the Court were becoming
increasingly uncomfortable with the substantive due process
methodology embodied in the Footnote Four Plus regime. The
evolution of the Court’s understanding of the substantive rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and its own role in
establishing standards to review claims of such rights was beginning
to follow a path more in line with the original meaning of the
Amendment. The stage was thus set for the type of substantive rights
analysis that the Court would deploy shortly thereafter in Lawrence.
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
A. The Facts and the Procedural Posture of Lawrence
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance, two officers of
the Harris County Police Department entered the residence of
89
petitioner John Geddes Lawrence in 1998. The officers observed
Lawrence and another man, petitioner Tyron Garner, engaging in a
90
consensual sexual act. The officers arrested the two men, who were
then held overnight before being charged and convicted before a
91
Justice of the Peace. The men were convicted of violating a state
92
law prohibiting homosexual sodomy through their act of “deviate
89. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003).
90. Id. at 563.
91. Id.
92. Id. The applicable state law broken by the petitioners was TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.06(a) (2003) providing that “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex,” defined as, “(A) any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. § 21.01(1).
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sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex
93
(man).”
The petitioners challenged their conviction in Harris County
Criminal Court as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and an analogous provision of the Texas
Constitution. The court rejected those claims and fined the
94
petitioners $200 each and assessed court costs of $141.25. The
Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District rejected the
petitioners’ federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and upheld the convictions, finding the U.S. Supreme Court’s
95
96
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick to be controlling.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Texas
Fourteenth District’s decision to consider three questions: whether
the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause, whether the
Texas law violated the Due Process Clause, and whether Bowers
97
should be overruled.
B. The Majority Opinion
It is through the lens of Bowers that Justice Anthony Kennedy
98
approaches the facts of Lawrence in the Court’s majority opinion.
Kennedy begins his constitutional analysis of Lawrence’s claim by
noting that the case must “be resolved by determining whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
99
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” To this extent,
100
Kennedy sets aside the Equal Protection Clause issue and deems it
93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
94. Id.
95. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
96. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
97. Id. at 564.
98. Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens (who had
vigorously dissented in Bowers), David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in the Court’s judgment, finding the Texas statute
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id. at 579.
99. Id. at 564.
100. See id. at 574–75.
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici
contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the
instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were
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necessary to revisit Bowers.101 Using Griswold as a “beginning point,”
Kennedy cites the various holdings102 of the Court since the 1960s
that have come to recognize “that the protection of liberty under the
Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental
significance in defining the rights of the person,” particularly in
regards to issues of sexual and reproductive freedom.103
With this background, Kennedy proceeds to a discussion of
Bowers, holding that decision as anomalous to the Court’s other
substantive due process cases.104 Kennedy refers to the Bowers
majority’s characterization of the issue before it as a determination of
whether or not there is a “fundamental constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy” as a disclosure of its “failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”105 In a sweeping
philosophical difference of opinion from Bowers, Kennedy observes
that the law before the Court in Lawrence, as well as the law that was
before the Court in Bowers, does far more than prohibit a particular
type of sexual conduct. For the majority, such laws intrude upon a
presumption of liberty that is granted to acts of private, and
presumably consensual, sexual conduct:
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or
not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
106
persons to choose without being punished as criminals.

Taking this analysis a step further, the majority observes that
such liberty interests preclude the state from intruding upon personal
we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit
the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 564. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(invalidating a New York law forbidding sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to persons
under 16 years of age); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman’s right to
elect an abortion has real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due
Process Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending contraceptive rights to
non-married persons).
103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
104. Id. at 567.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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choices protected by the Constitution, including choices related to
sexual autonomy:
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set
its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element
in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
107
choice.

The Court’s analysis of Lawrence’s claim is interesting because it
adjudicates the claim without clearly articulating the standard of
review that it is using. The Court does not declare that the Texas
sodomy law violates a “fundamental right,” thus failing a strict
scrutiny analysis; nor does the Court specifically declare that the law
lacks a rational basis. Rather, the Court simply states that the
petitioners have a constitutionally-protected liberty to decide the
nature of their intimate sexual conduct that the Texas law violates.
Thus, without announcing a particular standard of review or scrutiny
offered to liberty interests embedded in the intimate conduct of
homosexual individuals, the majority holds that the Bowers court
108
Finding that the
greatly misinterpreted the claim before it.
historical grounds for sodomy prohibitions that the Bowers court
heavily relied on in its decision were “overstated” and “more
109
complex” than indicated,
Kennedy next moves to discuss the
moral considerations that underlie Bowers.
Kennedy notes that much of the historical support for sodomy
laws stems from the invocation of traditional values or “Judeo110
Christian moral and ethical standards,” —the “religious beliefs,”
“conceptions of right and acceptable behavior and respect for the
traditional family” that are often used as justifications for prohibiting
111
homosexual behavior. Although these beliefs are far from trivial
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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and can be “profound and deep,” for the Lawrence majority, they fail
112
to answer the question before the Court. The Court declines to
enforce these views on the operation of all society through the
criminal law, as it finds that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty
113
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
The Court, in an effort to expand its due process inquiry beyond
114
an examination of only history and tradition, observes that against
the historical state interest in preserving a traditional sense of
115
morality is “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
116
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”
The majority cites evidence
buttressing this “emerging awareness,” ranging from the elimination
of sodomy as a crime from the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code, to the broad consensus against sodomy laws that has
developed in Europe since at least before the time Bowers was
decided, to the fact that the number of states with sodomy laws on
their books had dwindled from twenty-five as of the time of Bowers
to thirteen (of which only four applied exclusively to homosexual
117
conduct) when Lawrence was heard by the Court in 2003.
Additionally, substantive due process cases since Bowers were
seen by the majority as greatly questioning its rationale. Justice
Kennedy cites approvingly the Court’s decision in Casey as
reaffirming the substantive force of liberty, and significantly not
privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause, particularly as to
118
Similarly, the Court’s
choices one makes regarding sexuality.

112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
114. Id. at 572 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”)).
115. See id. at 571–72. The majority goes to great lengths to establish that the historical
moral consensus regarding homosexuality found by the Bowers court is far from apparent and
that the evidence offered by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger in their respective opinions
was clearly overstated.
116. Id. at 572.
117. See id. at 572–74. It should be noted that Lawrence is very much a part of an
ongoing debate on and off of the Court regarding the use of foreign legal opinions in U.S.
Constitutional cases.
118. Id. at 573–74 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
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119

holding in Romer v. Evans is seen by the majority as explicitly
denying the moral disapproval of homosexuals—“like a bare desire to
harm the group”—as a sufficient basis to satisfy rational basis
120
review. Thus, although the Court does not specifically say that it is
using rational basis review, it does hold in essence that the mere
moral disapproval of homosexuality by a legislative majority does not
constitute a rational basis supporting the constitutionality of
resulting legislation. Romer thus becomes a guidepost for the Court
in treating homosexuality with a higher level of judicial scrutiny than
it originally did in Bowers.
In a brief note on stare decisis, the majority observes that because
the “holding in Bowers . . . has not induced detrimental reliance
comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are
involved,” the Court should not feel restrained to let Bowers stand
on stare decisis grounds when there is ample evidence that its
121
rationale does not withstand careful analysis. Thus, in light of the
substantive due process analysis it has just conducted, the Court
declares “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today,” and, as it should not remain binding precedent, “it
122
should be and now is overruled.”
Kennedy’s majority opinion ends where it began, with a clear
focus on liberty. Observing that the sexual conduct of the petitioners
did not involve minors, coerced consent, persons who might be
injured, public conduct, or prostitution, the Court declares that
123
“[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”
The Court notes that its decision is not designed to give formal
recognition of any relationship that homosexual persons may choose
to enter into; rather, the Court’s decision is simply that “[t]he State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making

human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)).
119. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to Colorado’s constitution
which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either by
“orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,” and deprived them of protection under state
antidiscrimination laws was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” and failed
rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the measure had no rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose).
120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 582–83.
121. Id. at 577.
122. Id. at 578.
123. Id.
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their private sexual conduct a crime.”
Thus, the right of the
petitioners and other homosexual persons to “liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
125
government may not enter.’” Because the Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest for its broad intrusions into the personal
and private lives of individuals, it cannot withstand scrutiny under
126
the Due Process Clause.
The majority opinion concludes with the observation that its
interpretation of the Due Process Clause is wrought from the
understanding that the drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not presume to know liberty in its manifold
127
possibilities. This is significant because the Court appears to be
recognizing that the substantive content of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rooted as the majority sees it in the Due Process
Clause, is not bound purely by history and tradition in its present
day form. It may well be the case that laws once seen as necessary
and proper serve only to oppress. Thus, “[a]s the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
128
own search for greater freedom.”
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia issued a particularly scathing dissent in
Lawrence, which was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas. Many of Scalia’s sharpest barbs were
directed at what he perceived as the majority’s abuses of discretion.
Scalia argues that the Court was wrong in citing foreign sources of
authority to interpret the extent of liberty offered to homosexuals
129
under the Due Process Clause, and in its use of Casey (where the
Court declined to overturn Roe v. Wade on stare decisis grounds) to
130
argue that stare decisis should not apply to Bowers. Although many
of Justice Scalia’s arguments raise nuanced issues of constitutional
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
Id. at 578–79.
Id. at 579.
Id.
See id. at 598.
See id. at 586–91.
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law that exceed the scope of this note, his chief objection strikes to
the heart of the debate over the role of morality in law in the wake of
Lawrence: what standard of review ought the Court give to liberty
interests advanced by Lawrence and those similarly situated? Justice
Scalia, observing that the majority’s standard of review is unclear,
notes at the beginning:
Thus, while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves
strangely untouched its central legal conclusion: “[R]espondent
would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.” Instead
the Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as “an exercise of
their liberty”—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an
unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching
131
implications beyond this case.

Here Scalia rightly observes that the majority has declined to give
“strict scrutiny” or a similar standard of review to some fundamental
right claimed by the petitioners, and notes that the Court has not
observed a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
From the premise that there is no fundamental right to homosexual
sodomy under the Due Process Clause, Justice Scalia concludes that
the Court ignores earlier doctrine establishing that “only
fundamental rights qualify for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’
protection—that is, rights which are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
132
history and tradition’”— in invalidating Texas’s law.
Justice Scalia questions the Court for invalidating Texas’s law
because it imposes constraints on personal liberty, noting that while
the sodomy law undoubtedly constrains liberty, “[s]o do laws
prohibiting prostitution, recreational use of heroin, and, for that
133
matter, working more than 60 hours per week in a bakery.” Scalia
observes that by definition the “emerging awareness” in favor of
increased liberty rights cited by the Court cannot be “deeply rooted
134
in this Nation’s history and tradition[s].” As the Court did not,
and could not in Scalia’s estimation, reverse Bowers in finding a
“fundamental right” to engage in sodomy, Scalia argues that its
135
subsequent use of rational basis review is deeply flawed.
Scalia
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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Id. at 586 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 593 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 598 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 599.
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questions the Court’s blanket dismissal of Texas’s claimed interest in
its law, noting that,
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and
unacceptable,”—the same interest furthered by criminal laws
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and
136
obscenity. Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest.

For Scalia, the majority “effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation” in declaring that the state’s intrusion into the personal
life of the petitioners constitutes a violation of the Due Process
137
Clause.
Justice Scalia believes that if the majority is correct, a
slippery slope emerges, depriving the state of its power to legislate
morality: “If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the
138
above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.”
Justice Scalia concludes his dissent with an extraordinary passage
criticizing the Court’s decision as a “product of a law-profession
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual
activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has
139
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.” Scalia argues that
the Court has chosen to “take[] sides in the culture war” and in so
doing, ignores the fact that its views are not those of mainstream
140
America. Scalia claims that what the Court calls “discrimination,”
the majority of Americans view simply as measures “protecting
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be
141
immoral and destructive.” In a final argument against the Court,
Scalia claims that homosexuals have the right to persuade their fellow
citizens to repeal sodomy laws, but should have no recourse in the
courts to overturn democratically-approved and rationally-based
morals legislation. Scalia, expressing his moral positivism, concludes,
[P]ersuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one’s
views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id.
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would no more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts—or,
for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of them—than I
would forbid it to do so. What Texas has chosen to do is well
within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand
should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
“constitutional right” by a Court that is impatient of democratic
142
change.

Justice Scalia’s opinion offers an important critique of the substantive
rights analysis developed by the majority and praised in this note.
This note will address some of Justice’s Scalia’s more pointed
concerns in the following section.
D. What Lawrence Did and Did Not Do
At the end of the day, it is important to consider what Lawrence
accomplished and what it did not accomplish. Most obviously, the
decision invalidated the Texas sodomy law because it violated a
liberty interest recognized by the Court to be protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, although
Lawrence still remains committed to the post-Slaughter-House focus
on the Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in adjudicating substantive rights, it implicitly follows the
path developed in the Casey plurality opinion and recognized in
Justice Souter’s Glucksberg concurrence in viewing the limits of
constitutionally protected rights as existing on a rational continuum
open to “emerging standards of decency.” For the majority,
although history and traditions play a beginning role in substantive
rights analysis, they play only a beginning role. The Court holds that
for matters going to the ultimate questions of “existence” and
“meaning,” the individual’s right to liberty is both protected by the
Constitution and entitled to continuing recognition as new patterns
of such liberty emerge in a developing society.
It is also clear that Lawrence expands the notion of sexual
autonomy protected under the Constitution. It recognized that
Bowers was an anomaly in the Court’s adjudication of sexual
autonomy cases under the Fourteenth Amendment and accordingly
set that decision aside as an incorrect precedent. In doing so, the
Court clearly indicates that the expressions of intimate sexual

142. Id. at 603.
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conduct between consenting adults are protected by the
Constitution.
Finally, in an extension of Romer, the Court recognized that the
moral disapproval of a particular form of private sexual conduct on
the part of a legislative majority does not constitute a rational basis
justifying laws punishing or discriminating against such conduct.
Thus, Lawrence uses a form of rational basis review that actually
demands that the government show a justification for its restriction
on liberty beyond an appeal to tradition, history, or morals. Such a
move implicitly recognizes a judicial role in reviewing state
legislation for violations of minority rights protected by the
constitution, not as a usurpation of legislative power, but as a
structural counterweight to the majoritarian passions that from time
to time strip the individual of the rights guaranteed her by the
Constitution.
On the other hand, Lawrence does not create a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual conduct. Nor does it proscribe a new
standard of review to be used for all substantive due process cases.
Nor does it return us to a libertarian utopia overseen by omniscient
jurists that can protect citizens from all arbitrary and capricious uses
of state power.
But within Lawrence there is a potential reworking of many of
the problems that have plagued Fourteenth Amendment substantive
rights jurisprudence since Slaughter-House. As the next section will
argue, if the Court expands Lawrence beyond sexual autonomy cases,
there is tremendous potential for the decision to revolutionize, for
the better, the manner in which federal courts review state legislation
that infringes on the enumerated and unenumerated rights
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution because of their
essential place within the concept of ordered liberty. If the Court
does not expand Lawrence beyond its subject matter, it is possible
that Lawrence, like Bowers before it, will soon come to be seen as an
anomaly in the Court’s jurisprudence—a “one-hit wonder” in
constitutional law deployed when the Court only finds it expedient
to do so.
IV. LAWRENCE AS A POTENTIAL LIBERTARIAN REVOLUTION
Having offered analysis of Lawrence in the preceding section, this
note will now discuss Lawrence’s potential impact on constitutional
jurisprudence and the moral limits of criminal legislation. Lawrence,
869
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if read correctly and consistently by future courts, has the potential
to restore an accurate understanding of the substantive rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the role of the
judiciary in protecting those rights. The robust conception of liberty
advanced by Lawrence embraces a view of autonomy that is central
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of substantive liberties
and to broader conceptions of human autonomy central to the
purposes of liberal society. Lawrence thus has the potential to be
nothing less than a watershed moment for a renewed soundness in
constitutional jurisprudence.
A. Lawrence as a Libertarian Revolution
In Lawrence, the focus on liberty leads the Court to shift
burdens of proof from the plaintiff asserting a substantive rights
claim to the government defending its regulation; the claimant in
Lawrence was not required to demonstrate that his liberty interest
was fundamental. Rather, the government, under a form of “rational
basis with a bite,” was required to show that its regulation did not
arbitrarily interfere with an important liberty interest. This
development has the potential to improve the Court’s analysis of
future cases involving substantive rights claims by restoring the
Court’s focus to the fundamental nature of the government’s reason
for its restriction on liberty rather than on the individual’s expression
of liberty. Such a move would capture the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment—expressed in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause—to protect the fundamental rights enjoyed by all American
citizens. Put differently, Lawrence may hopefully soon come to be
143
seen as a libertarian revolution ushering in an era of heightened
deference to a presumption of liberty protecting the private actions
of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against unjustified
144
state action.
Randy Barnett, a scholar at Boston University Law School and
the Cato Institute, a Washington-based libertarian think tank, argues
143. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 21.
144. Id. But see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140
(2004) (arguing that a libertarian reading of Lawrence is mistaken because it fails too see the
Court is upholding a “fundamental right” within its silences); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27
(2003) (arguing that Lawrence stands for the proposition that the criminal prohibition on
sodomy is unconstitutional because it intrudes on private sexual conduct without having
significant moral grounding in existing public commitments).
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that by choosing to protect a broad claim of “liberty” in Lawrence,
the Court soundly returns itself to a broad constitutional vision of
individual liberties that avoids many of the more egregious mistakes
145
of twentieth century substantive due process jurisprudence.
Because the Lawrence Court eschewed the substantive due process
framework created by Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
146
it is possible that future cases pitting the liberty
Products Co.,
interests of the individual against the legislative judgment of the state
will, like Lawrence, neither presume constitutionality for the state’s
regulation, nor require a showing that the liberty interest being
asserted is “fundamental.” Barnett notes that, although it is never
explicitly stated,
Justice Kennedy is employing . . . a ‘‘presumption of liberty” that
requires the government to justify its restriction on liberty, instead
of requiring the citizen to establish that the liberty being exercised
is somehow ‘‘fundamental.’’ In this way, once an action is deemed
to be a proper exercise of liberty (as opposed to license), the
burden shifts to the government. All that was offered by the
government to justify [the statute in Lawrence] is the judgment of
the legislature that the prohibited conduct is ‘‘immoral,’’ which for
the majority (including, on this issue, Justice O’Connor) is simply
147
not enough to justify the restriction of liberty.

If Barnett is correct, Lawrence represents a constitutional
revolution for two reasons. First, Lawrence successfully overcomes
145. Barnett, supra note 27, at 21. Barnett observes,
[c]ontrary to how their decision was widely reported, the Lawrence majority did not
protect a “right of privacy.” Instead, quite simply, they protected “liberty.”
Breaking free at last of the post-New Deal constitutional tension between the
‘presumption of constitutionality,” on one hand, and “fundamental rights,” on the
other, Justice Anthony Kennedy and the four justices who joined his opinion did
not begin by assuming the statute was constitutional. But neither did they call the
liberty at issue “fundamental,” which the modern Court would have been expected
to do before withholding the presumption of constitutionality from the statute.
Instead, the Court took the much simpler tack of requiring the state to justify its
statute, whatever the status of the right at issue.
Id.
146. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
147. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36. It is probably also worth recalling that Justice Thomas
called Texas’s law “uncommonly silly” and noted that he would have voted to repeal it were he
a legislator. Although Justice Thomas declined to join the majority because he does not believe
that the Supreme Court should enforce substantive due process claims against the states, one
could presume that Justice Thomas is a seventh “vote” recognizing that the purported moral
basis of Texas’s law is a relatively flimsy justification for its existence.
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the major shortcoming of much of the post-Griswold jurisprudence.
Second, the decision places the onus on governments to demonstrate
the fundamentality of its legislation and refuses to accept legislative
appeals to tradition and morality alone as sufficient for meeting a
rationality requirement.
The first component of the potential Lawrence revolution comes
from the Court’s use of rational basis review. As was discussed
earlier, the Footnote Four Plus regime requires judges to find extraconstitutional “fundamental rights” in order to justify striking down
some of the most obvious examples of undue state interference with
personal autonomy. By placing its emphasis on whether or not the
petitioners are free to engage in private conduct as an exercise of
148
their “liberty” under the Due Process Clause, the Court returns
149
itself to legitimacy
and avoids a “jurisprudence of doubt” by
placing the obligation on the state to justify its regulation, rather
than on the individual to justify her exercise of liberty. Although
Lawrence does not take the simplest and most appropriate tack by
simply invalidating the Texas sodomy law under the Privileges or
Immunities clause, its version of rational basis review under the Due
Process Clause is such that it preserves many of the intuitions about
substantive rights that underlie the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This doctrinal move is significant because it, along with other
recent developments, signals a potential return of the Court’s
150
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to its proper foundations.
Although the Court gutted the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
151
Slaughter-House, it may not yet be a dead letter. Although the
Court since Slaughter-House has used the Due Process Clause to
protect citizens against state laws that violate their unenumerated
natural rights, such protection has not been at the level warranted by
152
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Under a proper construction of the Fourteenth Amendment,
abridgments of personal liberties guaranteed to all American citizens
148. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. It is significant that “liberty,” unlike “privacy,” is
explicitly mentioned in the text of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
149. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 29–31 (discussing the shortcomings of Griswold).
150. See supra Part II.A.
151. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (basing the unenumerated right to travel in
the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
152. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 320–21.
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by state legislation should be litigated in federal court. “When state
legislatures restrict liberties of the people, they are no more entitled
to be the judge in their own case than is Congress. The exercise of
liberty by the citizen should not be restricted unless the state can
show, to the satisfaction of an independent tribunal of justice, that
153
such a restriction is both necessary and proper.”
Of course Lawrence does not sweep this far and it does not
resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But Lawrence’s
burden-shifting more closely approximates the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the unenumerated rights
of citizens than Griswold and its progeny. Thus, Lawrence makes
sound doctrinal sense by protecting liberty rather than privacy,
“without any discussion of whether or not the liberty involved is
154
‘fundamental.’”
The Lawrence court protects the rights of the
petitioners to engage in sexual activity that is protected under the
contours of the Fourteenth Amendment and does so without having
to fashion any judicially-created rights or offering any activist
remedies; the Court simply asks the state of Texas to justify its heavy
restriction on liberty imposed by its sodomy laws and, finding no
necessary or proper justifications for the laws, protects the liberty
interest of the petitioners as American citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the court seizes upon this type of reasoning and
pursues it in future cases, much of the confusion and political
controversy surrounding substantive rights jurisprudence could be
cleared away. Judges would not be declaring “fundamentality” to
one set of favored rights of either the left or the right in a manner
that would smack of activism. Rather, all liberty interests that
amount to more than mere license could be given a presumption of
constitutionality rebuttable by a showing on the part of the
government that its restrictions on such interests are necessary and
proper according to some enumerated power or another.
Second, Lawrence is a triumph because it may stand for the
proposition that the mere invocation of morality is no longer a
rational justification for legislation interfering with the liberty
interests of individuals presumed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As Barnett argues, a legislative judgment of “immorality” simply
means that a majority of a legislature disapproves of the conduct
153. Id. at 321.
154. Id. at 334.
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155

being legislated against. Although this view may treat too glibly
the strongly held moral beliefs of many Americans against
homosexuality, the fact remains that, for all intents and purposes, the
rational basis standard of review that the Supreme Court offered to
“mere” liberty interests (as opposed to “fundamental” rights) prior
to Lawrence upholds essentially any legislative judgment of
156
morality. Thus, if a court declines to find a liberty interest to be
“fundamental,” as it did in Bowers, there is virtually zero chance that
the liberty interest will be sustained by the Court under the Due
Process Clause if the legislature proffers a “moral” justification for its
law. This is problematic, as Barnett observes, because “a doctrine
allowing legislation to be justified solely on the basis of morality
157
would recognize an unlimited police power in state legislatures.”
And, of course, an “[u]nlimited police power is the very definition of
158
tyranny.”
Moreover, by refusing to recognize “morals” legislation as a
justifiable exercise of the state power, the Lawrence court recognizes
an important judicial limit on the power of the states to restrict
individual liberties. Although the Constitution surely recognizes a
residual police power in the states, it is far from clear that this power
was ever recognized to extend to wholly private conduct. Lawrence is
crucial in restoring the integrity of the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in this context as well because it limits the
exercise of arbitrary state restrictions of private liberty, one of the
essential purposes of the Amendment. This does not mean that
Courts are designed to sit as super-legislatures that serve to override
majoritarian and democratic rule that judges find displeasing. Rather,
it means that when a particular democratic impulse serves to
undermine the substantive rights guaranteed to all American citizens
by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Courts have a role in
limiting legislative power. And the courts have a particularly
important role to play when popular legislation serves to arbitrarily
deprive individuals of their substantive rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment under vague appeals to “morals.” As Barnett explains:
155. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36.
156. At least for claims under the Due Process Clause; see supra note 6 for a discussion of
Romer and other Equal Protection cases where the court did use a form of rational basis review
to strike down “morals” legislation.
157. Barnett, supra note 27, at 36–37.
158. Id. at 37.
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The protection of “morals” is the most dubious aspect of the
traditional construction of the police power . . . . Only very rarely
was the power to protect “morals” used to reach wholly private
conduct. In other words, the traditional police power would more
accurately be defined as giving states power to protect the “health,
safety, and public morals” of the populace. A police power to reach
purely private “immoral” acts could always be asserted by a
legislature whenever it decides to prohibit any form of conduct. By
providing no judicially enforceable limit whatsoever on the police
power of states, such a construction would violate the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because it would permit
legislatures to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens, and
because it appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution, such a
159
claim of power is illegitimate.

Thus, at the end of the day, Lawrence, can be seen as a “very
160
simple, and indeed, elegant ruling.” Where earlier cases demanded
that specific liberty interests be litigated and approved of by the
Court before being recognized under the Due Process Clause,
Lawrence establishes that an area of personal autonomy exists as an
irreducible minimum preventing the state from arbitrarily depriving
persons of their right to define and constitute their own preferred
mode of existence. Lawrence is likely to endure because it “highlights
the futility of describing liberty in so one-dimensional a manner” as
161
Bowers did.
Indeed, “[t]he whole of substantive due process,
Lawrence teaches us, is larger than, and conceptually different from,
162
the sum of its parts.”
Despite the fact that Lawrence is praiseworthy as a significant
victory for liberty, few on the Court or elsewhere would be inclined
to support it as a good precedent, much less as a revolution in
substantive due process, if, as Justice Scalia claims, it truly “decrees
163
the end of all morals legislation.” For while, as has been noted
above, it is untenable for the Supreme Court of the United States to
accept a general legislative desire to prohibit “immorality” as a
rational basis for any criminal law, few among us would feel
comfortable living in a society where morality ceases to serve at all as
159. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 334.
160. Barnett, supra note 27, at 40.
161. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935 (2004).
162. Id. at 1937.
163. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599.
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a justification for criminal prohibitions. The next section of this note
addresses the moral limits of the criminal law in the wake of
Lawrence’s expansion of constitutionally protected personal liberty
interests in expressions of human sexuality.
B. The Limits of Legal Moralism: A Rejoinder to Justice Scalia
One of the primary arguments made by Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Lawrence focuses on what he perceives as the chief threat of the
Court’s opinion: an emptying of moral content from the law, the
result of acquiescence by the Court to the “so-called homosexual
rights agenda” in the ongoing culture war.164 Although the majority
states, in clear terms, that “the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,”165
nowhere in its opinion does the majority signal a willingness to
dispense with morals-based legislation altogether. Rather, the
majority simply holds that a general desire to invoke a particular
system of moral beliefs, through the operation of the criminal law, is
an invalid application of morality in the face of an “emerging
awareness” of a contrary liberty interest.166
Thus, by invalidating the Texas sodomy law, the Court does not
also invalidate the role of morality in the law. It merely establishes
that there are limitations to the role of morality in the law,
limitations clearly exceeded by the statute before it. Because the law
lacked a purpose beyond an apparent legislative judgment regarding
homosexuality as immoral, the law lacked a rational basis justifying
its heavy burden on the exercise of liberty. In doing this, the Court
neither acts extraordinarily nor recklessly. If anything, the Court
follows a longstanding practice of not relying exclusively on a
morals-based rationale for upholding lawmaking.167
To understand why Justice Scalia misstates the case, it is helpful
to consider some of the fundamental intuitions that underlie our
liberal society. Central to the notion of a liberal democracy is a high
regard for the autonomy of the individual. Assuring that all citizens
164. See id. at 598–99, 602.
165. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
166. See id. at 571–72.
167. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1234–36 (2004).
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are afforded a high measure of autonomy in their personal life
choices is one of the highest ethical precepts to which a liberal
society can ascribe. Thus, one of the fundamental moral principles of
a free society is that the individual, not the state, ought to be
responsible for making the choices that govern morality in the
personal sphere. The classic articulation of this notion is John Stuart
Mill’s essay On Liberty. Mill argues that individuals in civil society
ought to be granted the highest level of liberty compatible with
respect to the equal liberties of others. This is because moral virtue is
best established in a free society where the autonomy of individuals is
respected by the state.168
Practically speaking, Mill’s position should be appealing to
contemporary Americans. Mill’s understanding of virtue fits well into
a pluralistic system such as the United States. In a free society
composed of individuals with divergent philosophical, moral, and
religious persuasions, notions of freedom and morality are defeated
168. For a contemporary explanation of Mill’s view, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 209–10 (1971). Rawls, a contemporary liberal, summarizes the moral intuition
captured by Mill’s thought explaining the fundamental value of human autonomy:
Mill defines the concept of value by reference to the interests of man as a progressive
being. By this idea he means the interests men would have and the activities they would
rather pursue under conditions encouraging freedom of choice. He adopts, in effect, a
choice criterion of value: one activity is better than another if it is preferred by those who
are capable of both and who have experienced each of them under circumstances of
liberty.
Using this principle, Mill adduces essentially three grounds for free institutions. For
one thing, they are required to develop men’s capacities and powers, to arouse strong and
vigorous natures. Unless their abilities are intensely cultivated and their natures enlivened,
men will not be able to engage in and to experience the valuable activities of which they
are capable. Secondly, the institutions of liberty and the opportunity for experience which
they allow are necessary, at least to some degree, if men’s preferences among different
activities are to be rational and informed. Human beings have no other way of knowing
what things they can do and which of them are most rewarding. Thus if the pursuit of
value, estimated in terms of the progressive interests of mankind, is to be rational, that is,
guided by a knowledge of human capacities and well-formed preferences, certain
freedoms are indispensable. Otherwise society’s attempt to follow the principle of utility
proceeds blindly. The suppression of liberty is always likely to be irrational. Even if the
general capacities of mankind were known (as they are not), each person has still to find
himself, and for this freedom is a prerequisite. Finally, Mill believes that human beings
prefer to live under institutions of liberty. Historical experience shows that men desire to
be free whenever they have not resigned themselves to apathy and despair; whereas those
who are free never want to abdicate their liberty. Although men may complain of the
burdens of freedom and culture, they have an overriding desire to determine how they
shall live and to settle their own affairs. Thus by Mill’s choice criterion, free institutions
have value in themselves as basic aspects of rationally preferred forms of life.
Id.
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when the state circumvents individual autonomy by compelling a
particular view of morality. This does not mean that the state must
respect any choice that an individual makes or that it cannot develop
criminal law. It simply means that when an individual’s moral choice
does not harm the right of other individuals to make compatible
moral choices of their own, the state has no business in compelling
its own particular view of morality by making certain choices subject
to criminal sanction.
A contemporary exposition of Mill’s position is made by Joel
169
Feinberg in Harmless Wrongdoing, the fourth volume of his work,
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Feinberg’s work begins with
an analysis of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which maintains that
the only justifiable restraint on liberty is the restraint that prevents
170
Feinberg defends and fleshes out Mill’s harm
harm to others.
principle, examining four different “categories of justification for
criminal sanction” that have been traditionally advanced by various
communities: harm to others, offense to others, harm to the actor
171
herself, and so-called “harmless wrongdoing.”
In the first volume of his work, Feinberg argues that the
prevention of harm to others is a clearly acceptable use of the
172
criminal law. Feinberg asserts that “moral harm” to others does
169. See Beschle, supra note 6, for an excellent discussion of Joel Feinberg’s writings in
the context of Lawrence.
170. Mill, supra note 1, at 267. Mill argues:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so; because it will
make him happier; because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him . . . but not for compelling him . . . .
Id.
171. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM
TO OTHERS (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS]; JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM
TO SELF]; JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING (1988) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING]; JOEL FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS].
172. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 11 (arguing that “it is
legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private harm, or the
unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institutions and practices”); see
also FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at xix (defining and justifying the
harm principle as “[i]t is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be
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not justify the application of the criminal law;
rather, harm
requires an actual showing that the other person be harmed in some
174
way, not merely made “worse off.” Feinberg argues that some laws
criminalizing offenses to others are justified under the harm principle
175
in his second volume. “However, it will be insufficient to invoke
this justification by merely alleging that someone (or the community
at large) is offended by the knowledge that otherwise harmless,
though perhaps repulsive, activity is going on somewhere in
176
private.” Feinberg takes up the issue of “legal paternalism” in his
third volume, defined by Mill as the use of the criminal law to
“prevent harm (physical, psychological, or economic) to the actor
177
himself.”
Feinberg, like Mill, rejects this position as a valid
justification for criminal statutes because it too substantially
178
interferes with personal autonomy. Feinberg does, however, allow
that certain types of “soft paternalism” are “reasonable . . . ‘when but
only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when
temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is
179
voluntary or not.’”
With these considerations in the foreground, Feinberg turns to
the topic of present interest, criminal prohibitions on the so-called
“harmless wrongdoing” of the individual. Feinberg begins his fourth
volume by summarizing his earlier definition of the types of harm
that may properly be criminalized, arguing that only “harm to one’s
body, psyche, or purse” is justifiably criminal under the harm
180
principle. Feinberg accordingly argues that “where the individual
is merely acting in a way that, although not presenting any threat to
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one
prohibited from acting) and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost
to other values”).
173. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 66.
174. See id. at 105 (defining harm as a “setting back, thwarting, impairing, defeating, and
so on”).
175. FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 171, at 1–3. Application of the offense
principle is limited to “serious” offenses, which must be the result of wrongful conduct.
Although such offenses may justify criminal punishment, it generally is of a lesser magnitude
than actual harm to others. Id. at 3.
176. Id.
177. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 171, at 4.
178. Id.
179. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 260 (citing FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 171,
at 12).
180. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at xx.
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others or the community, merely indicates that the actor’s character
falls short of community norms, criminal punishment will not be
181
justified.”
Feinberg sets out to reject the various rationales offered for
prohibiting harmless wrongdoing. Feinberg dismisses arguments for
moral conservativism (the use of legal coercion in order to prevent
182
and strict
drastic change to a particular group’s way of life)
moralism (the use of legal coercion against non-grievance evils
simply on the basis that they are deemed by some value system as
183
“inherently immoral”), claiming that both rationales fail to square
184
soundly with the harm principle.
He similarly rejects “legal
perfectionism,” the doctrine that “it is a proper aim of the criminal
law to perfect the character and elevate the taste of the citizens who
are subject to it,” because it violates the basic principle of liberty that
185
she is defending. Feinberg rejects legal perfectionism because, “[i]t
would be manifestly absurd to threaten people with punishment in
order to give them wisdom, style, integrity, or a better sense of
humor . . . . Genuine generosity, concern, magnanimity, and
courage are not readily produced by a policeman’s billy club or
186
threats of imprisonment.” In the final analysis, the only “virtue”
instilled through means of coercion is obedience to authority. For
Feinberg, and most in the Western ethical tradition from Aristotle

181. Beschle, supra note 6, at 267–68, (citing FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING,
supra note 171, at 118–20).
182. See FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 171, at 39–80.
183. See id. at 124–73.
184. See id. at 79–80 (“[M]uch of what we call morality consists of rules designed to
prevent evils of a kind whose existence would not be the basis of any assignable person’s
grievance. No one can complain on his own behalf, or vicariously for another, if someone has
evil thoughts (short of the intention to act on them) or false beliefs, or violates his own
religious duties. If these things are evils, they are evils that ‘float free’ and are incapable of
grounding personal grievances. The free-floating evils do not hurt anybody; they cause no
injury, offense, or distress; they are not in any way unfair. At most, they are matters for regret
by a sensitive observer. To prevent them with the iron fist of legal coercion would be to
impose suffering and injury for the sake of no one else’s good at all. For that reason the
enforcement of most non-grievance morality strikes many of us as morally perverse.”).
185. Id. at 277. This does not mean that the state may not choose to instill virtue in its
citizens. Feinberg claims that it “seems undeniable that the state may properly attempt to
promote public virtue and raise the level of excellence throughout society by such methods as
moral and cultural education in the public schools, subsidies to the arts and sciences, and
awards and prizes to virtuous exemplars.” Id. at 278.
186. Id. at 281.
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on, genuine virtue can only be developed and practiced by the free
187
choice of the autonomous individual.
If one accepts the premise that in a free society personal ethics
can result only from individual choice and not state compulsion,
Feinberg’s analysis offers a good explanation of why it is wrong for
acts of harmless wrongdoing to be punished by the criminal law.
After all, if morality is the result of free choice, it is self-defeating to
compel individual moral action through threat of criminal
punishment. Seen in this light, much of the alarmism of Justice
Scalia’s Lawrence dissent can be disarmed. The Court, like Feinberg,
is not attempting to eliminate the role of morality in the law by
declining to accept Texas’s asserted “moral” basis for its prohibition
on sodomy. Although the Court’s opinion holds “a state’s argument
that in forbidding homosexual sodomy it is merely giving effect
through law to the moral and ethical principles of a majority of its
citizens, without more, cannot justify and constitutionalize a
188
deprivation of the liberty to engage in such conduct,” “[it] does
not disable government from promoting traditional or majoritarian
views of morality, it merely removes the criminal law weapon of
189
coercion.”
One of the most cited passages from Justice Scalia’s dissent
argues that by striking down the Texas sodomy statute, the Court
opens the door for widespread invalidations of other criminal laws
with a “moral” basis, such as laws “against bigamy, same-sex
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
190
Although there may be
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.”
191
logical problems with this slippery slope argument,
its biggest
problem is that it likely ignores what is truly at stake in the liberty
interest upheld by the Court. One could argue that Justice Scalia, by
187. See id. at 281–82.
188. Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual Sodomy
Issue: The Journey from Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 78 (2004).
189. Beschle, supra note 6, at 269.
190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
191. See Bradley Dowden, Fallacies, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/fallacies.htm#Slippery%20Slope (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
Suppose someone claims that a first step (in a chain of causes and effects, or a chain
of reasoning) will probably lead to a second step that in turn will probably lead to
another step and so on until a final step ends in trouble. If the likelihood of the
trouble occurring is exaggerated, the slippery slope fallacy is committed.
Id.; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Slippery Slop: The Maddening “Slippery Slope” Argument Against
Gay Marriage, SLATE, May 19, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2100824.
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focusing on the physical act of homosexual sodomy in his analysis,
misses the broader point of the Court, namely that it is the liberty
interest of the individual to define his own concept of existence, not
his right to engage in physical acts of sodomy, that is truly at stake in
Lawrence. Another line of reasoning would argue that Justice Scalia
fails both to see the significance of homosexuality in contemporary
American life, and to recognize the fact that homosexuality is no
192
longer seen by many as a sexual “deviance.”
While these arguments have their merits, they make too much of
what ought to be a simple rejoinder to Justice Scalia: the sodomy law
struck down in Lawrence, unlike many of the contestants in his
“parade of horribles,” simply eludes adequate justification under the
harm principle. Justice Scalia is right that some acts, such as
fornication and masturbation, can probably no longer be
criminalized in the wake of Lawrence; but these acts would fall under
an interpretation of the harm principle in the same analysis that
193
Because no one is harmed by these acts
proceeded above.
(assuming that they are done privately and, in the case of fornication,
consensually), they should not be criminalized based solely on the
194
grounds of a generalized moral grievance of the legislature.
192. See Tribe, supra note 161, at 1915.
Critics of the Lawrence approach often advance hypotheticals about the
decriminalization of adult incest or bigamy to suggest the supposedly illimitable
effects of decriminalizing sodomy. When confronted with such hypotheticals, we
need only ask whether it is at all plausible to imagine the dynamic sketched above—a
dynamic constituted by violent intolerance toward those open about their intimate
relations and by equally devastating self-erasure by those closeted about their sexual
orientations—at work in these other, very different, contexts. Incest laws draw
circles around individuals, defining the finite set of family members so closely tied by
blood or adoption that sexual intimacy becomes too dangerous or volatile for
society to sanction. These restrictions no doubt inflict a heavy burden on particular
hapless individuals whose misfortune it is to lust after or to fall in love with a family
member, but such tightly drawn circles bear no real resemblance to the broad lines
cutting oppressively across society to rule half the adult population off limits as
sexual or marital partners for a distinct and despised minority. So, too, the circles
that our adultery and bigamy laws have drawn around married couples have
established partitions that fall with an undeniably cruel weight upon individuals who
fall in love or lust with someone else’s spouse. But these laws—special instances, in a
sense, of the customary bans on interference with beneficial contractual relations—
likewise cut no wide swath through the population to limit the options open to any
particular oppressed minority.
Id. at 1944.
193. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 271–72.
194. Id.
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As for laws against bigamy, bestiality, incest, and prostitution, it
should be noted that, unlike prohibitions against sodomy, these laws
are in most cases designed to prohibit actual harms, as opposed to
mere “moral” harm. Many (but admittedly not all) instances of
195
bigamy and incest are based on fraud and coercion. Moreover, it is
important to remember that the Lawrence court did not rule in favor
of homosexual marriage; it simply held that criminal sanctions
against private consensual conduct are inappropriate, saying nothing
about what a state can or cannot do in crafting its marriage statutes.
There is a substantial public health concern that pervades the taboo
against bestiality,196 and likewise, concerns for public health and
against the exploitation of women underlie the criminalization of
197
prostitution. It is worth noting here that the Lawrence majority
requires of the state justifying a regulation of liberty that it show that
198
its regulation is not an arbitrary suppression of liberty. Where it is
obvious that Texas’s prohibition on sodomy was nothing more than
an arbitrary exercise of state authority to express a discriminatory
moral disapproval of homosexuality, it is possible, and indeed likely,
that challenges to bigamy, bestiality, and incest laws would be seen
as having rational justifications by the Court, even in a postLawrence world.
Moreover, it is crucial to recognize the point made by Professor
Tribe that it is somewhat disingenuous to compare the insular and
miniscule part of the population that wishes to voluntarily engage in
acts of bigamy, bestiality, or incest with the significant population of
homosexual Americans who define their very identity as gay or
lesbian persons, and who were genuinely harmed and branded as
criminals—a stigma that had hampered homosexual Americans in
areas ranging from employment to adoption rights—by sodomy
199
laws. Indeed, the majority itself makes this argument by asserting
195. Id. at 271, 274.
196. Id. at 274.
197. Id. at 272.
198. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). “Arbitrariness” may well be the
ultimate standard of review the Court intends to use in the form of rational basis review that it
creates in Lawrence. Such a view is certainly not at loggerheads with the view of the standard of
review articulated above.
199. See Tribe, supra note 161, at 1944.
[The] [c]riminalization of same-sex sodomy visited a wide range of harms upon gay
and lesbian Americans. These injuries are inflicted upon gay men and lesbians
regardless of whether a given sodomy law is gender-neutral or gender-specific.
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that an emerging awareness recognizes that liberty includes the right
to define one’s own concept of meaning, of life, and of the universe.
This claim carries with it important philosophical assumptions about
200
the very nature of autonomy in liberal society.
At a minimum,
Lawrence recognizes that homosexuality is an expression of human
sexuality that is at the very heart of personhood—one that the Court
cannot ignore without debasing some of our most valued social
notions of human autonomy and freedom as a liberal, constitutional
society. To equate homosexuality with criminalized activity devalues
the sense of autonomy that defines personhood in liberal society.
Indeed Lawrence goes to matters of ultimate conscience and
personhood; it concerns the facts of life fundamental to the way that
the individual understands her place in the universe, as well as in civil
society. The Court exercises an important function by passing
judgment in this arena: it protects the autonomy rights of a
significant minority of American citizens against the arbitrary
The approach taken by the Lawrence majority eliminates the harms associated
with sodomy laws altogether. For example, employers—both governmental and
private—can no longer rely on sodomy statutes to justify firing or not hiring gay
employees. Courts cannot invoke a state’s sodomy law to deny custody of a child to
a gay parent. Most significantly, the privacy approach banished the taint of
criminality from gay identity. Gay men and lesbians need no longer think of
themselves as criminals.
Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509,
541–42 (2005).
200. See RAWLS, supra note 168, at 543. Rawls argues that the intuitions of rational
individuals adduced from behind a veil of ignorance that blinds them of their own personal
prejudices and characteristics, would favor protecting human freedom and autonomy as a first
principle of justice. All free and rational persons in a liberal society would thus want the same
“primary goods”—liberties and benefits—to be distributed in such a way as to maximize the
potential that a person could fulfill their own life plan according to their personal conception
of the good, whatever that conception may turn out to be. Thus, there is a heavy liberal
intuition in favor of allowing self-respecting and autonomous persons to sketch out their own
nature in a free society:
[U]nder favorable circumstances the fundamental interest in determining our plan
of life eventually assumes a prior place. One reason for this I have discussed in
connection with liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. And a second reason
is the central place of the primary good of self-respect and the desire of human
beings to express their nature in a free social union with others. Thus the desire for
liberty is the chief regulative interest that the parties must suppose they all will have
in common in due course.
Id.; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 50 (1974). Nozick, Rawls’
libertarian colleague, similarly sees a paramount value in human autonomy and personhood in
civil society: “A person’s shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of
giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive
for meaningful life.” Id.

884

ZPARK.FIN

837]

9/12/2006 8:45:35 AM

The Presumption of Liberty in Lawrence v. Texas

discrimination of a majoritarian legislative preference that, in failing
to grasp the true liberty interest at stake in human sexual relations,
reduces homosexual conduct to a criminal activity.
Justice Scalia’s remaining “horribles” are easy to distinguish.
Laws against adultery clearly fall under the purview of the harm
principle because the philandering spouse obviously harms his or her
201
counterpart. Additionally, adultery violates the contractual nature
of marriage which society has a cognizable interest in enforcing. As
for the issue of same-sex marriage, by invoking it, Justice Scalia
ignores clear statements by the Court that its ruling does not validate
gay marriage efforts, and “conflates failure of a state to provide equal
202
access to benefits with criminal punishment.”
In short, Justice Scalia’s slippery slope argument ignores the
central proposition of the harm principle echoed in Lawrence: that
the state may not criminalize harmless personal behavior that is
protected because of the autonomy and liberty enjoyed by all
individuals. Traditional morality, at the end of the day, is no
justification for coercion on the part of the state. Although the state
may properly regulate, or make regular, the exercise of individual
liberty to assure that it does not serve to harm or wrong others by
203
becoming mere license,
it simply cannot justify criminal
restrictions on personal autonomy solely by invocations of
“traditional morality.”
V. CONCLUSION
Few inside or out of the Court have any idea what the future
impact of Lawrence will truly be. This note has established that
Lawrence is indeed a landmark decision, and a significant victory for
a richer Constitutional vision of individual liberty. If Lawrence can be
developed from its controversial subject matter, perhaps it can
expand its unique methodology to future cases, thus preserving
other valuable liberty interests against undue restraints on the part of
the state.
The brief example of a timely issue may be illustrative. Last year
the Supreme Court upheld Congressional regulation of marijuana
under the Controlled Substances Act pursuant to Commerce Clause
201. See Beschle, supra note 6, at 270.
202. Id. at 272–73.
203. See Barnett, supra note 27, at 37.
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powers notwithstanding a California law allowing individual
possession of marijuana for medical purposes.204 Although the
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich focused on the Commerce
Clause, the Respondents in that case raised substantive due process
arguments claiming that the medicinal use of marijuana is a liberty
interest protected within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.205
The Supreme Court did not address the substantive due process
claim on its merits, but did remand it as a question for the Ninth
Circuit to reconsider.206
On Monday, March 27, 2006 the Ninth Circuit heard oral
arguments in Raich on remand.207 The appellants in Raich argue
extensively in their briefs that Lawrence’s substantive due process
analysis requires judicial recognition of an emerging liberty interest
protecting the rights of certain terminally ill patients to seek palliative
medical care in the form of cannabis use.208 The appellants in Raich
cite the Supreme Court’s respect of “decisional autonomy” in
Lawrence—“the individual’s interest in making basic decisions about
the course of her life without government interference”—as standing
for the proposition that medicinal use of marijuana is a
constitutionally-protected decision that shapes the life of the
individual.209
The disposition of Raich by the Ninth Circuit (as well as any
future Supreme Court review following the Ninth Circuit’s
anticipated ruling) will offer a window into the future of Lawrence. If
the Court’s substantive rights analysis in Lawrence stands for what
this note has presented, the federal courts would be wise to use the
present opportunity to expand that case’s methodology beyond cases
concerning sexual autonomy. The medical marijuana issue presents
another opportunity for the courts to articulate a vision of liberty
embracing the right of the individual to determine questions of
fundamental existence free of arbitrary legislative constraints. The
Ninth Circuit should follow Lawrence in demanding that the federal
204. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
205. Id. at 2215.
206. Id.
207. See Ninth Circuit oral argument schedule, available at http://www.angeljustice.
org/downloads/RemandNinthCircuitCourtofAppealsCalendar.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
208. See Brief for the Petitioners, Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454),
available at http://www.angeljustice.org/downloads/RemandRaichvGonzalesOpeningBrief
.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
209. Id. at 27.
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government justify its restriction on the exercise of liberty central to
the life decisions made by American citizens. Absent a compelling
justification on the part of the federal government that prohibitions
on medicinal marijuana are necessary and proper components of a
justifiable regulatory system, the federal courts should protect the
substantive rights of California citizens to use cannabis as a part of a
regulated palliative care regime. Such a ruling would reinforce the
doctrinal power of Lawrence and move it beyond the contentious
realm of sexual autonomy cases.
In any case, Lawrence should be seen as a valuable piece of
jurisprudence and should continue to be vigorously defended against
misinterpretation and abuse by forces on either side of the political
spectrum. The Court’s decision should not be seen as a rejection of
the moral beliefs of some Americans or the vindication of the moral
beliefs of other Americans. It should simply be read for what it is: a
ringing endorsement of the principle that in the United States of
America, decisions of fundamental morality are not the province of
the legislature. Rather, the Constitution protects the right of all
citizens to decide for themselves questions fundamental to their view
of life, meaning, and existence. The answers to those questions are
certainly open to robust debate in a free society. But, unless such
answers result in a demonstrated harm to others, it is fundamentally
impermissible for the state to criminalize them.
Mitchell F. Park
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